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Entrepreneurial activity is often regarded as an engine for economic growth and job creation. 
Through tax policy, governments possess a potential lever to influence the decisions of 
economic agents to start and close small businesses. In Germany, the top marginal income tax 
rates were reduced exclusively for entrepreneurs in 1994 and 1999/2000. These tax reforms 
provided two naturally defined control groups that enable us to exploit the legislation changes 
as “natural experiments”. First, the tax rate reductions did not apply to freelance professionals 
(Freiberufler), and second, entrepreneurs with earnings below a certain threshold were not 
affected. Using data from two different sources, the SOEP and the Mikrozensus (LFS), we 
analyse the effect of the tax cuts on transitions into and out of self-employment and on the 
rate of self-employment. We apply a “difference-in-difference-in-difference” estimation 
technique within a discrete time hazard rate model. The results indicate that the decrease in 




JEL classification: H24, H25, J23 
Keywords: Taxation, entrepreneurship, natural experiment, difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimation 
  1 1 Introduction 
 
Do taxes play a role in the decision to become and to remain an entrepreneur? Extensive 
research exists on the individual determinants of being an entrepreneur, but the influence of 
taxes is less understood and controversial. Governments in Germany and elsewhere have 
discussed and implemented various policies to promote entrepreneurship, following the view 
that entrepreneurs are vital to the dynamism and innovative capacity of an economy. More 
specifically, entrepreneurship is often regarded as an engine to create new jobs and as a means 
to escape unemployment. This is of particular interest to the current policy debate in Germany 
and other countries with high rates of unemployment. As among the various potential 
determinants of entrepreneurship, taxation is under direct control of the government, tax 
policy is frequently suggested as an instrument to stimulate entrepreneurship. A better 
understanding of the impact of taxes on firm foundations and closures is crucial to evaluate 
these efforts. 
Economic theory does not provide unambiguous guidelines with respect to taxation and 
entrepreneurship. On the one hand, Gentry and Hubbard (2000) argued that a progressive tax 
schedule decreases the expected after-tax return from a risky project and thus discourages 
entry into entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the classic view of Domar and Musgrave 
(1944) demonstrated that governments may encourage entrepreneurship by sharing risk 
through progressive taxation. Even if the tax system treats income from wage employment 
and self-employment differently, the ambiguity remains: Bruce (2002) illustrated that the 
effect of a differential tax treatment on the decision to be self-employed depends on 
individual preferences over return and risk. 
The empirical literature has exploited tax reforms as natural experiments to analyse the effects 
of taxation with individual micro data since Feldstein (1995). Few empirical studies exist 
about taxation and entrepreneurship, though. Most of this literature only considers entries into 
self-employment or the propensity to being self-employed, and it is mostly limited to US data 
(e.g. Cullen and Gordon 2002; Moore 2004). Only Bruce (2002) studies exits from self-
employment, also in the U.S.A..  
We analyse two tax legislation changes in Germany that exhibit specific features which make 
them especially suitable to be exploited as natural experiments. These tax reforms were 
introduced as a tax relief for small and medium sized enterprises. In the first reform, the top 
marginal tax rate of the personal income tax schedule, which was 53% for all types of income, 
was limited to 47% exclusively for self-employment income from a trade business above a 
  2certain threshold. This tax rate limit was further reduced in a second reform (in two steps 
down to 45% in 1999 and to 43% in 2000, combined with lower associated income 
thresholds). Importantly, the law makes two distinctions that naturally define treatment and 
control groups for our interpretation of the reforms as experiments. First, as mentioned before, 
only individuals with income from trade above the threshold defined by the law benefited 
from the limitation of the top marginal tax rate. Thus, tradesmen with income below the 
threshold serve as a control group. Second, the law does not apply to all self-employed 
individuals, but only to tradesmen (Gewerbetreibende) as opposed to so-called freelancers 
(Freiberufler). The latter are self-employed persons who have one of various professions that 
have traditionally been classified as freelance professions by the German income tax law, e.g. 
physicians, lawyers, architects, and journalists. This distinction enables us to track the 
freelancers as additional control group. Other influential factors, such as additional tax 
legislation changes that came into effect in the period under investigation, affected both the 
treatment and control groups. Thus, they do not distort our analysis under the assumption that 
the groups were influenced by these other factors in the same way. 
In short, this paper provides four main contributions. Firstly, to draw a complete picture of the 
impact of taxation on entrepreneurship, firm start-ups, firm closures and the resulting number 
of entrepreneurs are of equal importance. This paper analyses entries into and exits from self-
employment and the overall probability of being self-employed to provide this integrated 
view. Secondly, this is the first empirical study of entrepreneurial choice and taxation in 
Germany. It compares the results based on two different datasets: the German Socio 
Economic Panel (waves 1984-2001) and the Mikrozensus (Labour Force Survey; repeated 
cross-sections of 1996-2001). The third contribution is the econometric analysis of spell data 
and the application of a discrete time hazard model. This enables us to control for the 
important effect of the duration of an individual’s self-employment spell on the decision to 
exit entrepreneurship, and equally for the effect of the employment or unemployment spell 
duration on the decision to enter entrepreneurship. Survival analysis has been applied to study 
entrepreneurial choice (Evans and Leighton 1989; Taylor 1999), but these studies did not 
consider the impact of taxes; Schuetze and Bruce (2004) pointed out that ignoring the survival 
of self-employed ventures has been a significant shortcoming of the existing tax related 
literature. The forth contribution of this paper stems from the fact that the two German tax 
reforms we analyse luckily provide two independent dimensions to define a control group. 
This allows us to apply a “difference-in-difference-in-difference” estimator (Gruber 1994) to 
  3isolate the effect of the reforms. This method controls for reform-independent trends in a 
more robust way than the conventional difference-in-difference technique. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section summarises prior 
studies about entrepreneurship and taxation. Section 3 explains the legislation changes that are 
relevant to this analysis. In section 4, we introduce the two German datasets we use, elaborate 
on the definition of the treatment and control groups, and provide descriptive statistics about 
entrepreneurship in Germany. Section 5 describes the econometric methods we apply. The 
results are presented and discussed in section 6, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Literature  Review 
2.1 Theory 
 
Theoretic approaches to the impact of taxes on entrepreneurial activity provide ambiguous 
results. Gentry and Hubbard (2000), on the one hand, assumed risk-neutral agents and argued 
that a progressive tax schedule is comparable to a “success tax” by lowering the expected 
after-tax return from a risky project. Domar and Musgrave (1944) provided a contrasting 
view, assuming risk-averse agents and imperfect financial markets with respect to risk-
sharing: Through a progressive tax schedule, governments share risk with entrepreneurs by 
smoothing net profits and losses and thus encourage risky entrepreneurial activity. Cullen and 
Gordon (2002) added another argument for the view that higher income tax rates may 
increase the propensity to become self-employed in the U.S.A.. American firms always have 
the option to avoid high personal tax rates by incorporating ex post and being taxed at the 
lower corporate tax rate. Thus, a firm generating tax losses will prefer to be not incorporated 
so that the entrepreneur can deduct these losses against other personal income, while a profit 
generating firm will prefer to incorporate. This option to choose the organisational form based 
on the outcome can thus be interpreted as a net subsidy to risk taking. Better (legal) tax 
avoidance and (illegal) tax evasion opportunities available to the self-employed can also 
explain a positive relationship between the tax rate and the self-employment rate. 
The tax reforms we consider in this study represent a reduction of the top marginal tax rates 
exclusively for self-employed tradesmen, but not for wage and salary employees. Thus, the 
legislation changes introduced a differential tax treatment of the two alternative sectors self-
employment and dependent employment. Bruce (2002) provided a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of a tax system with differential treatment. In his simple portfolio choice model, 
which is similar to Tobin (1958), individuals can allocate some fixed amount of labour 
  4between wage employment and self-employment. The gross return on wage employment w is 
assumed to be certain, whereas the gross return on self-employment s is uncertain with 
expected value μs and variance σs
2. For each labour supply portfolio p, i.e. for each 
combination of time allocated to wage employment and self-employment, one can calculate 
the expected return μp and variance σp
2. The individual can select the combination of 
expected return and risk that yields the highest utility level, subject to a budget constraint, 
which is given by the interrelationship between expected return and variance of the portfolio. 
The different tax rates τw for wage employment and τs for self-employment enter this budget 
constraint in such a way that they shift the budget line downward in comparison to a case 
without taxes, and they make the slope steeper if τw > τs, i.e. if the self-employed are tax-
advantaged, as is the case in the tax reforms we study. Figure 1 depicts how an individual 
adjusts her labour supply after the tax rate for self-employment is decreased, while the tax rate 
for wage employment is left unchanged. B is the budget line before, and B’ after the reform. 
w’ represents the after-tax return to wage work, which is the same before and after the reform. 
 
Figure 1: Effect of differential taxes on portfolio choice (example) 
σp
B 







  5In the example shown in the figure, the individual devoted all of her time to self-employment 
before the reform (μp = μs, σp = σs,) but after the tax rate on self-employment is lowered, she 
shifts time from self-employment to wage employment. The actual direction and magnitude of 
the effect will be individual-specific, depending on individual tax rates and preferences over 
return and risk. This ambiguity does not change if individuals are restricted to boundary 
solutions, i.e. they supply all labour either to wage employment or to self-employment. 
2.2 Empirical  Literature 
 
Various recent empirical studies about the impact of taxes on entrepreneurship have followed 
the approach to analyse individual taxpayer or income survey panels and to exploit changes in 
the tax legislation as natural experiments. The idea is to isolate the effect of the tax reform by 
comparing the activity of the same taxpayers before and after the reform, trying to control for 
other influential factors. This approach has been introduced by the new tax responsiveness 
literature, which studies the elasticity of taxable income with respect to income tax rates. 
Feldstein (1995) analysed the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the U.S.A., which reduced the income 
tax rates while broadening the tax base, and estimated a substantial elasticity of taxable 
income with respect to marginal tax rates. Gruber and Saez (2002) addressed identification 
problems faced by previous work and provided new evidence of a significant tax rate 
elasticity. Gottfried and Schellhorn (2003) studied the effect of the German income tax reform 
in 1990 using a taxpayer panel. The estimate they obtained for the elasticity of taxable income 
was very small when they used the whole sample. For the subgroup of self-employed 
taxpayers, however, the estimated elasticity was much higher than for other taxpayers, 
suggesting that entrepreneurs respond substantially to tax rates. 
The empirical literature about the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship reflects the 
fundamental theoretical ambiguity that was described in the previous section. Most empirical 
studies examine either the decision to enter self-employment or the propensity of being self-
employed, but ignore entrepreneurial survival. Nevertheless, even the effects of the tax system 
on the better studied entry and occupational choice decisions remain controversial. Using the 
Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances and the US Current Population Surveys for the 
period 1983-1994, Schuetze (2000) reported that higher income tax rates, as well as 
unemployment rates, were associated with an increase in the rates of male self-employment in 
Canada and the U.S.A.. Georgellis and Wall (2002) found a U-shaped relationship between 
marginal tax rates and entrepreneurship using a spatial panel approach. At low tax rates the 
relationship was negative, and at high rates it was positive. Bruce (2000 and 2002) studied the 
  6effect of taxes on entering and also on exiting self-employment. Analysing the US Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics, he found that decreasing an individual’s expected marginal tax 
rate on self-employment income reduced the probability of entry, while a similar decrease in 
the average tax rate increased this probability. Similarly, higher tax rates on self-employment 
income were found to reduce the probability of exit. Both of these studies involved the use of 
exogenous changes in tax rules to generate instrumental variables for addressing the possible 
endogeneity of individual-specific tax rates. Moore (2004) used repeated cross section data 
from the Survey of Consumer Finances in the USA and exploited the 1986 and 1993 tax rate 
reforms as natural experiments. This strategy allowed him to apply the difference-in-
difference technique to account for the tax rate endogeneity. The results suggest that the 
marginal and average income tax rates are negatively related to the propensity to become self-
employed. A recent cross-sectional study by Parker (2003) casted doubt on the importance of 
tax policy on the self-employment decision. By examining two 1994 cross sections of UK 
data he found no evidence that the decision to be self-employed is sensitive to taxes or 
opportunities for evasion. 
Rather than studying entrepreneurial entry and exit, other panel data studies examined the 
effect of taxation on the activity of entrepreneurs in business. Carroll et al. (2000a,b;2001) 
used taxpayer panel data from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Individual Tax Files for 1985 
and 1988. Relying on exogenous variation provided by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, they 
examined how entrepreneurs’ income tax situations affect the growth of small firms’ receipts, 
the amount of labour they hire, and the volume of capital investment they undertake. The 
results suggest that higher marginal tax rates reduce overall firm growth (as measured by 
receipts), the probability of hiring employees, and mean investment expenditures. Harhoff and 
Ramb (2001) shed light on the effect of taxation on investment in Germany. Using firm-level 
balance sheet panel data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, they analysed the relationship 
between capital user costs and investment and obtained a negative user cost elasticity of 
investment. This result suggests that taxes, which also increase the user costs of capital, 
depress investments, and this way it seems plausible that they also influence the decision to 
found or close firms. The following section introduces the tax reforms we exploit in order to 
identify the effect of taxation on entrepreneurship. 
 
  73  Tax Reforms as Natural Experiments – The Location 
Preservation Act and the Tax Relief Act 
 
To understand the effect of income taxes on entrepreneurial choice, we analyse specific 
legislation changes in Germany in the 1990s that reduced the top marginal income tax rates 
exclusively for self-employed tradesmen (Gewerbetreibende)
1. These tax reforms make it 
possible to study the impact of income taxes on entrepreneurial choice without distortions 
from a simultaneous change in the tax environment in the alternative sector, i.e. wage and 
salary employment. The legislation changes we exploit as natural experiments are known as 
tax rate limitation for income from trade (Tarifbegrenzung für gewerbliche Einkünfte), 
enacted in § 32c of the income tax law (Einkommensteuergesetz, ESt). The context of these 
reforms was a reduction of the corporation tax (Körperschaftsteuer). These tax cuts were 
implemented with the intention to make Germany a more competitive business location in the 
globalised economy. However, a reduction of the corporation tax rate without complementary 
measures would have favoured corporations, which are typically relatively large, over not 
incorporated companies, e.g. sole proprietors and partnerships, which are typically small and 
medium sized. These businesses are not subject to corporation tax; the sole proprietors or 
partners pay progressive personal income taxes instead. Thus, the legislator decided to reduce 
the tax burden of not incorporated companies at the same time as lowering the corporation tax 
rate. 
The first reform we analyse is the Location Preservation Act (Standortsicherungsgesetz, 
StandOG) of September 13
th, 1993. It reduced the corporation tax rate for retention earnings 
from 50% to 45%. In the same act, by first introducing § 32c ESt, the general top marginal 
personal income tax rate of 53% was limited to 47% for earnings from trade businesses above 
DM 100,278 (€ 51,271). The law went into effect on January 1
st, 1994. According to the 
financial report 1994 of the Federal Ministry of Finance, the limitation of the top income tax 
rate for tradesmen led to reduced tax earnings of € 716 million in the first year. 
The second reform relevant to our analysis is the Tax Relief Act (Steuerentlastungsgesetz, 
StEntG 1999/2000/2002) of March 24
th, 1999, which was put into effect retroactively on 
January 1
st, 1999. It further reduced the corporation tax rate for retention earnings to 40% and 
limited the top marginal personal income tax rate for earnings from a trade to 45% (above 
DM 93,744 or € 47,931) in 1999 and to 43% (above DM 84,834 or € 43,375) in 2000. The 
fiscal impact of the tax rate limitation for tradesmen at 45% was a reduction in tax revenues of 
€ 593 million in 1999, and the tax rate limitation at 43% further lowered tax revenues by 
                                                 
1 The term tradesmen (Gewerbetreibende) is used to distinguish from freelancers (Freiberufler) – see section 4.3. 
  8€  700 million in 2000, according to the financial report 1999 of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance. 
The general top marginal tax rate for all personal income other than from trade businesses, 
e.g. wages and salaries, was still left unchanged at 53% in 1999. Reductions of the general 
personal income tax rates were faded in in 2000 and continued in the following years (the top 
marginal income tax rate was reduced to 51% in 2000 and to 48.5% in 2001 – the latter 
reduction had been scheduled for 2002 by the aforementioned Tax Relief Act but was pulled 
forward by the Tax Reduction Act in 2000). The Tax Relief Act included a variety of 
complementary measures, partly intended to compensate parts of the fiscal impact. However, 
we do not expect these and other legislation changes to distort our analysis because there is no 
reason to belief that they affected the treatment group in a different way than the comparison 
group. 
Figure 2 visualises how the two laws whose effects we analyse make the top marginal income 
tax rate for tradesmen depart from the general top marginal income tax rate to follow the 
reductions of the corporation tax rate on retention earnings. 
 



















Following these reforms, the Tax Reduction Act (Steuersenkungsgesetz, StSenkG 2000) of 
October 23
rd, 2000 not only scheduled further personal income tax rate reductions for 2003 
(top marginal rate: 45%) and 2005 (top rate: 42%), but also introduced a corporation tax 
reform at a larger scale, coming into effect on January 1
st, 2001. Among other measures, the 
corporation tax rate for both retention earnings and distributed earnings was reduced to 25%. 
  9For our analysis it is important to note that this reform replaced the limitation of the top 
personal income tax rate for tradesmen (§ 32c of ESt) with a different tax relief for the same 
group: § 32c of ESt was abolished, and in turn, tradesmen were granted a lump sum deduction 
of the community trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) from their personal income tax liability. Thus, 
the treatment group is affected in a different way than the control group by this reform. To 
avoid a bias of our analysis, we limit our data to observations prior to the time the Tax 
Reduction Act 2000 could influence the actors. 
 
4 Data 
4.1  Socio-Economic Panel and Mikrozensus 
 
We base our analysis on two different annual micro data sets from Germany. The first data 
source is the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) provided by the German Institute of 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin). It is a representative panel survey containing detailed 
information about the socio-economic situation of about 5 to 12 thousand households in 
Germany and the individuals living in these households.
2 We are using 18 waves from 1984 
(the first wave available) to 2001. The second data source is the Mikrozensus (micro census), 
which is provided by the Federal Statistical Office. It is an official representative household 
survey, similar to the Current Population Survey in the U.S.A. and the Labour Force Survey 
in the UK. The German part of the European Union’s Labour Force Survey is organised as a 
sub-sample of the Mikrozensus. The Mikrozensus gives information about the German 
population and labour market, involving 1% of all households in Germany every year, i.e. 
about 370,000 households per year.
3 For scientific purposes, a scientific use file is available 
which is factually anonymised for reasons of data protection; it includes 70% of the records. 
We are drawing on 5 cross sections from 1996 to 2000. We are not including years before 
1996 because that was the first year which includes a retrospective question on a respondent’s 
employment status in the year prior to the interview (t-1), an information we need to identify 
transitions. Thus, using the Mikrozensus we can only analyse the second reform in 1999, 
while using the SOEP we can include the first reform of 1994 as well. The retrospective 
question on last year’s employment status was only posed in a 45% sub-sample of the 
Mikrozensus (selected at random), so we base our analysis on this sub-sample. 
                                                 
2 For a description of the SOEP see also Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2001). 
3 More information about the Mikrozensus can be found at http://www.destatis.de/themen/e/thm_mikrozen.htm. 
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advantages of each dataset and to ensure their specific disadvantages are not driving our 
results. The panel structure of the SOEP allows us to tract individuals over time and observe 
their spells in a certain employment status. This makes it possible to model the hazard of 
changing the employment state (e.g. leaving self-employment) controlling for duration 
dependence. The SOEP also includes retrospective questions about a respondent’s age at his 
most recent occupational change and the age at his first job. This allows us to calculate the 
correct duration of an employment or self-employment spell even if the spell had begun 
before the respondent first entered the panel. Thus, we can account for left-censoring which is 
otherwise a typical problem in survival analysis using stock sample data. Moreover, the SOEP 
provides a rich variety of control variables. For example, retrospective questions about the 
individual employment history enable us to calculate a respondents’ lifetime work and 
unemployment experience. The number of observations in the SOEP is limited, however, 
which becomes notable when we analyse to the self-employed and their transitions. It is also 
possible that entrepreneurs are underrepresented in the sample, because they often dispose of 
relatively little free time and may be less willing to answer the SOEP questionnaire over many 
consecutive years than other groups. 
In comparison with the SOEP, the main advantage of the Mikrozensus is its larger sample 
size.
4 Furthermore, as the Mikrozensus is an official census, most questions in the 
Mikrozensus are subject to compulsory response. So there is no reason to expect that 
entrepreneurs, including those with high income, are underrepresented. On the other hand, the 
Mikrozensus only provides cross-sectional data. We have information about a respondent’s 
employment status in the year prior to the interview from the retrospective question, so we 
can identify and model transitions, but we cannot observe the duration of individual 
employment or self-employment spells, and thus cannot control for duration dependence.
5 
Another disadvantage of the Mikrozensus is that only information on net income is available, 
coded in 18 categories until 1999 and in 24 categories from 2000 onward; the SOEP, in 
contrast, provides gross and net incomes measured on metric scale, and income from self-
employment can be distinguished from wage and salary income.
6
                                                 
4 For example, the unweighted number of exits from (entries into) self-employment within the treatment group in 
the observation period after the 1999 reform is 134 (1,679) in the SOEP and 1,729 (17,276) in the Mikrozensus. 
5 There is a retrospective question asking what year the respondent entered his current occupational position, but 
this information does not enable us to determine the spell duration before a transition. 
6 Respondents are asked to state what their average monthly income in both employment types was in the year 
prior to the interview.  
  114.2 Sample  Design 
 
The SOEP dataset is converted into person-year format, i.e. one record is created for every 
year a person is interviewed in. The Mikrozensus dataset is organised similarly (here, each 
person is only observed in a single year). In both datasets, we restrict the sample to 
individuals between 18 and 65 years of age and exclude those currently in education, 
vocational training, or military service, and civil servants. The excluded individuals 
presumably have a limited occupational choice set, or at least they have different determinants 
of occupational choice that could distort our analysis. 
Like in most empirical studies about entrepreneurial choice, we use self-employment as a 
measurable proxy for the concept of entrepreneurship. Individuals are classified as self-
employed when they report self-employment as their primary activity.
7 We exclude farmers 
and family members who help in a family business from the datasets, because we assume the 
former have different determinants of occupational choice than other entrepreneurs, and 
helping family members are not entrepreneurs in the sense that they run their own business.  
In this study, first of all we are interested in transitions into and out of self-employment. In the 
SOEP, we can identify a transition when we observe the same individual over two 
consecutive years t and t+1, and in t+1, the individual has a different employment status than 
in t. Interviews for the SOEP are carried out from January to September, with most interviews 
being conducted during the first three months of the year. Thus, it is more likely that the 
transition actually occurred in t, and we set a transition dummy equal to one in year t (see 
Figure 3). The first legislation change we analyse, the Location Preservation Act, was passed 
in September 1993 and came into effect on January 1
st 1994. Most transitions we assign to 
year 1993 (i.e. transitions between the interview periods in 1993 and 1994) are probably not 
influenced by the reform, taking into account that adjusting expectations and eventually 
changing occupation as a reaction to the reform took some time. In contrast, transitions we 
assign to 1994 are potentially influenced by the reform. Consequently, all observations from 
1994 onward are marked by a “post 1994 reform” dummy. The second reform, the Tax Relief 
Act 1999/2000/2002, was passed in March 1999. The more generous top marginal tax rate 
limitation went into effect in two steps, on January 1
st 1999 (retroactively) and January 1
st 
2000. We assume that actors perceived both steps as a single reform and adjusted their 
expectations and behaviour after the bill was passed. Thus, most transitions we observe in 
                                                 
7 In principle, with this approach we should also be able to catch conversions of the legal form of a company as a 
reaction to the tax reforms: An unincorporated firm is run by a self-employed sole proprietor or by various self-
employed partners, but in an incorporated firm, which is a legal entity, the managers are employees. It is not 
entirely clear, though, if all respondents make this distinction correctly when answering the question. 
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“post 1999 reform” dummy is assigned to all observations from 1999 onward. For the joint 
estimation of the effects of the two reforms, we convert the “post 1994 reform” to a “post-
1994, pre-1999 reform” dummy variable that is zero for all observations from 1999 onward to 
avoid an overlap of the two reform dummy variables. Regarding the interpretation of the 
“difference-in-difference-in-difference” estimators this implies the coefficients associated 
with the second reform measure the cumulated effect of the two reforms. 
We decided not to include observations that are potentially influenced by the Tax Reduction 
Act 2000, because this reform affected tradesmen in a different way than freelancers, as 
mentioned in section 3, and is likely to have affected people differently across income classes, 
as shown by Haan and Steiner (2005). The bill was passed on October 23
rd, 2000, and the 
corporate tax reform came into effect on January 1
st, 2001. Transitions we observe in 2000 are 
most likely not to be influenced by the reform, especially taking into account the time lag 
before agents adjust their behaviour, but transitions in 2001 are likely to be influenced. Thus, 
we exclude the years 2001 and later. The 2001 wave is only used to determine if individuals 
had a transition in 2000 and to obtain retrospective information about their incomes in 2000. 
Additionally to analysing transitions, we also want to study the prevalence of self-
employment. Thus, we estimate the probability that someone is observed being self-employed 
in a particular year (point in time). For this estimation we have to shift the time scale one 
year. A person observed in the state of self-employment can only have been influenced by a 
reform after having had the opportunity for a transition. Thus, the “post 1994, pre 1999 
reform” dummy ranges from 1995 to 1999 in this model, and the “post 1999 reform” dummy 
now starts no earlier than in 2000. Following the same logic, the last year we include for this 
estimation is 2001. The first year is 1985, because we include last year’s employment status 
as an explanatory variable here. This information must be inferred from the wave in the 
previous year, and 1984 was the first SOEP wave. 
In the Mikrozensus, we observe each person only in a single year t, but the person’s 
employment status in the previous year t-1 can be derived from a retrospective question, 
which was included in all cross-sections since 1996. Thus, we set the transition variable in 
year t to one if an individual’s employment status in year t-1 differs from the status in year t. 
The reference week of the employment status question is always the last week in April, so the 
transition is actually more likely to have occurred in t-1. Taking this into consideration, the 
“post 1999 reform” dummy has to span the cross-sections 2000 and 2001, that means 
transitions occurred after April 1999 and before April 2001. We exclude later cross-sections 
  13to avoid interactions with the Tax Reduction Act 2000. We can use the same sample for the 
estimation of the probability of being of self-employed. 
 
Figure 3: SOEP sample construction 
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4.3  Definition of the Treatment and Control Groups 
 
The tax reforms we chose to study, described in section 3, provide two dimensions along 
which the treatment and control groups can be distinguished. First, the legislation changes 
were only applicable to tradesmen (Gewerbetreibende) as opposed to freelancers 
(Freiberufler). Second, only individuals with a gross income above a certain threshold were 
affected by the reforms. Table 1 sketches the definition of the treatment group. 
 
Table 1: Treatment and control groups 
  Gross income below threshold Gross income above threshold
Tradesmen 
(Gewerbetreibende)  Control Group  Treatment Group 
Freelancers 
(Freiberufler)  Control Group  Control Group 
 
  14The distinction between tradesmen and freelancers is simple in the analysis of self-
employment spells using the SOEP data, because self-employed individuals are classified as 
freelancers or “other self-employed” individuals here. As we excluded farmers, we can 
classify “other self-employed” as tradesmen.
8 Classification gets more difficult when we 
study transitions from dependently or not employed to self-employed individuals, or the 
individual propensity to be self-employed. In these models we also have to assign a label 
“potential tradesman” or “potential freelancer” for dependently employed and not working 
individuals. Thus, we classify all the professions individuals can report into trade and 
freelance professions according to the catalogue in the German income tax law and the 
prevailing jurisdiction.
9 That means, we label someone as a “potential freelancer” if he 
reports a profession that would be a freelance profession if he were self-employed, no matter 
if he is actually self-employed or not. For example, a physician can be employed in a hospital, 
unemployed/not working, or self-employed. In the latter case she would be a freelancer in the 
sense of the law. Thus, we interpret all physicians as “potential freelancers”, i.e. she would be 
a freelancer if she decided to become self-employed. All individuals not classified as 
“potential freelancers” are labelled as “potential tradesmen”. We apply the same procedure for 
the Mikrozensus data; here, we apply the procedure for the analysis of self-employment spells 
as well, because the Mikrozensus does not provide the information if a self-employed person 
is a freelancer. 
This approach is only valid under the assumption that individuals do not change their 
profession between potential freelance professions and potential trade professions when they 
decide to enter or exit self-employment, because that would mean individuals are switching 
from control to treatment group or vice versa. We are confident that this assumption is 
realistic, though, because most professions require specific education and work experience; 
this is especially true for freelance professions which are usually specialised academic 
professions. Some exceptions may exist, but should not bias our estimates because there is no 
reason to expect that switchers follow a systematic rule. 
In both datasets we use, individuals who are unemployed and those not participating in the 
labour force usually do not report a profession. So our data does not provide obvious criteria 
to determine if they are likely to become a tradesman or a freelancer if they become self-
                                                 
8 To be precise, in the German tax legislation it is also possible to be self-employed without being tradesman, 
freelancer, or farmer, e.g. private asset managers and executors of a will. These infrequent professions are 
neither coded in the SOEP nor in the Mikrozensus, however, and because of their small number, they can be 
neglected in our analysis. 
9 Table A 1 in the appendix lists the professions we classify as “potential freelance professions”; all other 
professions are classified as “potential trade professions”. Note that classification is sometimes ambiguous, so 
this can only be an approximation. 
  15employed. By assumption, we label them as “potential tradesmen”. This somewhat arbitrary 
classification will not distort our estimation of the effect of the tax reforms, however, because 
it is unlikely that the income of formerly unemployed or not working individuals will be 
above the threshold in the first year of starting up their own business. Thus, they are part of 
the control group anyway and the distinction between tradesman and freelancer is not relevant 
here. 
Apart from distinguishing between tradesmen and freelancers, the second dimension for 
separating out the treatment group requires determining if the individuals’ gross income from 
self-employment are above the threshold defined by the income tax law, since only tradesmen 
with income above the threshold benefited from the top marginal tax rate limitations. As the 
threshold first set in 1994 was reduced in 1999 and 2000 (see section 3 for the exact nominal 
thresholds), we create a dummy variable indicating if an individual’s income is above the 
1994 threshold and another one indicating if it is above the 2000 threshold. We do not treat 
the 1999 threshold separately, first because it is not substantially different from the 2000 
threshold, and second, because the two steps of the second reform (1999 and 2000) were part 
of the same act, the Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002, and we treat the act as a single reform. In 
1999, when the act was passed, agents already knew about the threshold and tax rate they 
would face in 2000, and it is likely that they adjusted their expectations and their behaviour 
with respect to the legislation in 2000, and not to the temporary situation in 1999. 
For the self-employed, we observe their income from self-employment directly.
10 For the 
dependently employed, unemployed and not working individuals, we have to estimate the 
counter-factual income they would earn if they decided to be self-employed. Both using the 
SOEP and the Mikrozensus, we select the self-employed and estimate Mincer-type earnings 
regressions of income from self-employment on a set of demographic and human capital and 
work related variables. More precisely, we choose education dummies, age and its square, 
number of children, dummies indicating marital status, and regional dummies as explanatory 
variables; using the SOEP, we can also include lifetime experience in full-time and part-time 
employment and unemployment, the duration of the self-employment spell and its square, and 
firm size and industry dummies
11; using the Mikrozensus, we also include dummies 
indicating the city size. We estimate these earnings regressions separately for males and 
females and for each year. Then we use the estimated equations to predict counter-factual 
                                                 
10 To use the Mikrozensus, we have to make the assumption that the self-employed do not have additional wage 
and salary or capital income. 
11 The industry dummies are normalised in such a way that the base category represents the average industry 
effect. This allows to predict earnings accurately for the unemployed and not working individuals as well, for 
whom we do not observe an industry, by assigning them the average effect across all industries. 
  16income from self-employment for those who are not self-employed.
12 In the model of the 
probability of being self-employed, we also use predicted income from self-employment for 
the self-employed in order to treat all observations in the same way. 
The Mikrozensus has two limitations concerning the income information: First, only net 
income is given; and second, the information is only available in form of a categorical 
variable with 18 net income classes until 1999 and 24 classes from 2000 onward. To deal with 
the second problem, we approximate a self-employed person’s net income by the interval 
midpoint of his income class and use it as the dependent variable in the regression of self-
employment earnings described above. To address the other problem, we use a simple 
function to compute a proxy for gross income from the predicted net income. As we are not 
interested in an individual’s exact income, but only need to know if the gross income exceeds 
the threshold, we consider these approximations to be sufficient. Bach, Corneo and Steiner 
(2005) calculated average income tax rates for different income deciles in Germany for the 
year 1998. The thresholds we are interested in lied in the 8
th income decile, where the average 
income tax rate was 14.5% (including the so-called solidarity surcharge – 
Solidaritätszuschlag). The other way round, net earnings have to be multiplied by 1.168 to 
calculate gross earnings. For our analysis it does not matter that the true progressive tax 
schedule is flatter for income deciles at the bottom of the distribution and steeper for top 
deciles. As we are only interested in determining if an individual’s gross income is above the 
threshold, we can replace the true monotonically increasing function, which calculates gross 
income from net income, by any other monotonically increasing function, as long as it crosses 
the gross income threshold at the same value of net earnings as the true function. This 
condition is satisfied by the linear function with the slope 1.168 which replicates the average 
tax rate of the 8
th decile. In a future refined version of this research, however, a more accurate 
tax function that takes into account the marital status and other influential individual factors 
should be applied. Note that using the SOEP, the problem of calculating gross income does 
not occur, as gross income is directly provided. 
We have to make a choice whether to use real or nominal incomes. As the income threshold 
defined by the tax law refers to nominal income, at first sight it seems reasonable to use 
nominal incomes in order to decide who is really affected by the law. If we used nominal 
incomes, however, individuals would creep up from the low income group to the high income 
group with time just due to inflation. Haan and Steiner (2005) showed that this bracket 
creeping effect is quite strong in the German tax system. For the application of the difference-
                                                 
12 The regression and prediction results are available from the authors upon request. 
  17in-difference estimation method, such a systematic flow from the control group to the 
treatment group has to be avoided. What really matters for the analysis is a split between 
richer and poorer individuals, and we need a definition that is consistent and stable over time. 
Thus, we decide to deflate all incomes (and also the thresholds defined by the law) using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
4.4 Descriptive  Statistics 
 
In this study, we analyse the rates of transitions into and out of self-employment and the 
overall rate of self-employment as an occupational choice. The mean annual entry and exit 
rates and the average self-employment rate, based both on the SOEP and the Mikrozensus 
samples, are shown in Table 2. The exit rates are given as percentages of self-employed 
persons, whereas the entry rates are given as percentages of employed, unemployed and 
inactive people. As the latter group is much larger in size, the entry rates are naturally much 
smaller then the exit rates. 
 
Table 2: Mean yearly transition and self-employment rates (in %) 
Outcome variable  Weighted mean value (percent)  Size of sub-sample (person-years) 
SOEP 1984-2001 
Yearly exit rate from self-employment  12.47  4,103
1
Yearly entry rate into self-employment  1.31  95,942
2
Self-employment rate  6.16  92,079
3
Mikrozensus 1996-2001 
Yearly exit rate from self-employment  12.07  40,289
4
Yearly entry rate into self-employment  1.15  662,617
5
Self-employment rate  6.57  741,545 
1 currently self-employed individuals, waves 1984-2000 
2 individuals who are not currently self-employed, waves 1984-2000 
3 individuals whose employment status in the previous year (t-1) is observed, waves 1984-2001 
4 individuals who were self-employed in the previous year (t-1)  
5 individuals who were dependently employed, unemployed or inactive in the previous year (t-1) 
 
From the static view we move on to a dynamic view. Figure 4 shows the development of self-
employment in Germany between 1984 and 2003, based on the weighted SOEP data. The 
most evident finding is that the number of self-employed persons has increased significantly 
during the last 20 years. The growing importance of self-employment in the German labour 
market has been described in other studies, e.g. by Duschek et al. (2003), who investigated the 
period 1985 to 2001 using the Mikrozensus, and is backed by official statistics provided by 
the Federal Agency for Employment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2004). Figure 4 also depicts 
the numbers of self-employed tradesmen and of those with income above the thresholds 
defined by the tax law (see section 3), revealing that these sub-groups follow roughly the 
same trend. 
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The development of the transition rates into and out of self-employment over the years is 
shown in Figure 5, based on weighted SOEP data for all years and weighted Mikrozensus data 
for 1996-2001 only. Again, the exit rates are much higher than the entry rates, because the 
exit rates are measured relative to the small number of self-employed persons, whereas the 
entry rates are measured relative to the large number of employed, unemployed and inactive 
people. For the years 1996-2001, the figure also shows that the rate of exit from self-
employment is much more volatile when measured using the SOEP than when measured 
using the Mikrozensus, which can be explained by the larger standard error in the SOEP due 
to the much smaller sample size. The directions of the movements of the exit rates based on 
the two datasets are the same in all these years, however, which graphically confirms that both 
datasets actually reflect the same process, where the SOEP sample just has a greater standard 
error. 
 







1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
SOEP: exits (% of self-
employed people)




Mikrozensus: exits (% of
self-employed)
Mikrozensus: entries (% of
employed, unemployed and
not employed people)
Do self-employed people differ in observable characteristics from those in the alternative 
employment states, i.e. dependent employment or unemployment/inactivity, and how? 
Extensive literature suggests that there are significant differences; one reason might be that 
entrepreneurship requires specific human capital (see, for example, Lazear 2004 and 
Blanchflower 2004). Table 3 and Table 4 show descriptive statistics based on the SOEP and 
the Mikrozensus, respectively, and confirm that there are important differences between the 
groups.
13 Among the self-employed, the share of females is much smaller (30-34%, 
depending on the dataset) than among the employees (44-47%), and it is highest among the 
inactive and unemployed persons (63-78%). With a mean of 44-45 years, self-employed 
people are on average older than employees, who are on average 40-41 years old. Self-
employed individuals are most likely to have a university degree, and unemployed/inactive 
people are the least likely. Among the three groups, employees most often completed an 
apprenticeship. In the SOEP data, we can observe if the father is or was self-employed, which 
is true for 23% of the self-employed persons, but only for 10% of those not self-employed. 
Using the Mikrozensus, we also evaluate information about the spouse’s working status and 
income. 52% of the self-employed have a spouse who is working, but only 45% of the 
                                                 
13 Differences between the two datasets can in part be explained by the different period of observation, which is 
1984-2000 in case of the SOEP and 1996-2001 in case of the Mikrozensus; another reason are different 
definitions of some variables. For the exact definitions of the variables in the two datasets, see Table A 2 and 
Table A 3 in the appendix. 
  20employees and only 33% of the unemployed/inactive people. In spite of this, the average 
spouse’s income is highest in the group of inactive and unemployed people, probably because 
a married person is more likely to opt out of working if the spouse has a high income. 
The retrospective question about last year’s employment status available in the Mikrozensus 
provides some interesting insights. 78% of self-employed persons were already self-employed 
the year before, indicating a substantial state dependence. This finding strongly suggests that 
it is necessary to control for duration dependence in the econometric model (see section 5.2). 
12% of the self-employed were dependently employed in the year before, but only 1.5% were 
unemployed and another 1.5% were inactive; transitions from employment to self-
employment seem to be the most relevant route of entry into self-employment. Employment 
and unemployment/inactivity also exhibit strong state dependence: 88% of employees were 
already employees the year before, and 85% of the unemployed/inactive were in the same 
state before (15.9% were unemployed and 69.4% were inactive). 
Based on our finding that observable differences between the three employment state groups 
are evident in the two datasets, we can conclude that it is necessary to control for these 
observable characteristics in the empirical model (see section 5.1). 
 
Table 3: Weighted mean characteristics by employment status (SOEP 1984-2000) 
Variable Unit  Self-employed 
persons
1) Employees  Unemployed/ 
inactive persons 
Female %  33.59  44.32  78.27 
East Germany  %  11.42  14.61  12.80 
High school  %  33.06  17.28  9.95 
Apprenticeship %  41.25  51.23  42.62 
Higher technical college  %  27.89  19.83  17.53 
University %  25.90  13.63  6.95 
Age years  44.06  40.54  43.73 
Full time work experience  years  17.11  15.26  10.30 
Part time work experience  years  1.47  1.64  1.48 
Unemployment experience  years  0.35  0.40  1.13 
Disabled %  3.64  5.90  9.42 
German %  95.38  90.80  87.82 
Children under 17 in household  number  0.62  0.57  0.78 
Married %  65.79  62.13  75.59 
Separated %  3.03  1.75  1.97 
Divorced %  9.67  7.95  7.04 
Self-employed father  %  22.62  9.99  9.53 
Home ownership  %  55.34  40.40  42.77 
Employment status spell duration  years  6.61  8.37  3.46 
Person-year observations
2) number 8831  107169  39185 
1) Individuals are classified as self-employed when they report non-farm self- 
employment as their primary activity (excluding help in family business) 
2) Individuals between 18 and 65 years       
 
  21Table 4: Weighted mean characteristics by employment status (Mikrozensus 1996-2001) 
Variable Unit  Self-employed
1) 
persons  Employees  Unemployed/ 
inactive persons 
Female %  29.57  46.74  62.99 
East Germany  %  20.23  22.13  25.06 
Age years  44.58  40.14  49.57 
Secondary school: no answer  %  6.20  5.73  11.69 
Sec. school: Gymnasium  %  29.43  15.04  8.23 
Sec. school: Realschule  %  34.58  39.62  24.68 
Sec. school: Hauptschule  %  29.79  39.61  55.39 
Professional qualification: no answer  %  15.26  17.92  36.48 
Apprenticeship %  41.02  63.52  53.72 
Master craftsman  %  17.92  7.04  4.03 
Advanced technical college  %  7.60  4.79  2.39 
University %  18.20  6.72  3.37 
German %  94.36  93.68  91.04 
Children under 18 in household  number 0.65  0.63  0.50 
Married %  70.35  63.67  71.18 
Spouse's income per month  € 1,000 0.917  0.707  0.955 
Spouse's working status: no answer  %  32.95  38.81  31.21 
Spouse is working  %  52.25  44.95  32.60 
Spouse is not working  %  14.80  16.24  36.19 
Other household income per month  € 1,000 1.180  1.102  1.208 
City size: up to 20,000  %  45.02  45.43  42.86 
City size: 20,000-500,000  %  37.61  40.11  41.75 
City size: more than 500,000  %  17.37  14.47  15.39 
Empl. status previous year: no answer  %  7.10  5.58  3.36 
Employee in previous year  %  12.40  88.31  10.85 
Self-employed in previous year  %  77.53  0.84  0.53 
Unemployed in previous year  %  1.47  2.87  15.85 
Not employed in previous year  %  1.50  2.39  69.41 
Person-year observations
2) number 71344 616087 356772 
1) Individuals are classified as self-employed when they report non-farm self-employment 
as their primary activity (excluding help in family business) 
2) Individuals between 18 and 65 years       
 
In section 4.3 we described how we defined treatment and control groups to be able to 
interpret the tax reforms we analyse as natural experiments. Table 5 presents descriptive 
statistics for the treatment group “tradesmen with income above the 1999 (reform) threshold” 
and the control groups “tradesmen with lower income” and “freelance professionals”. To get a 
picture of the characteristics of the actual self-employed tradesmen and freelancers, we base 
this analysis on the sub-sample of the self-employed. We use the SOEP to derive the statistics, 
because the SOEP directly distinguishes between self-employed tradesmen and freelancers, so 
there is no ambiguity in separating the groups in contrast to the Mikrozensus, where we have 
to base the group assignment on the reported profession (see section 4.3). 
  22The table reveals important differences between the treatment and the control groups. Only 
9% of the treatment group members are female, whereas 39% of the tradesmen with income 
below the threshold and 35% of the freelancers are women. 63% of the freelancers have a 
university degree, but only 24% of the tradesmen above the income threshold and even only 
13% of those below the threshold. The reason is that almost all freelance professions are 
academic professions, whereas many of those we call tradesmen are craftsmen, shopkeepers 
etc. Those in the treatment group are also more likely to have a self-employed father (26% vs. 
19% in the two control groups). Not surprisingly, home ownership is more common among 
the high-income treatment group than among the other groups. 
 
Table 5: Weighted mean characteristics by treatment and control groups 
(self-employed persons









Female %  9.07  38.88  35.13 
East Germany  %  6.30  14.78  11.88 
High School  %  28.09  21.56  65.31 
Apprenticeship %  47.42  47.12  22.60 
Higher Technical College  %  32.75  29.77  18.86 
University %  24.07  13.23  62.63 
Age years  43.89  43.43  42.19 
Full Time Work Experience  years  20.22  17.26  12.22 
Part Time Work Experience  years  0.23  1.73  1.95 
Unemployment experience  years  0.32  0.45  0.36 
Disabled %  4.59  2.86  1.45 
German %  96.34  96.40  95.45 
Children number  0.67  0.65  0.73 
Married %  67.04  67.39  61.05 
Separated %  2.56  2.11  3.93 
Divorced %  11.62  8.86  13.20 
Self-employed Father  %  26.03  18.99  19.44 
Home Ownership  %  61.82  54.56  47.62 
Employment Status Spell Duration  years  8.04  6.59  5.88 
Actual Weekly Work Hours  hours  54.90  47.78  39.63 
Person-year observations
2) number 782  3252  1288 
1) Individuals are classified as self-employed when they report non-farm self- 
employment as their primary activity (excluding help in family business) 
2) Individuals between 18 and 65 years       
 
  235 Empirical  Methodology 
 
In this section, we describe the econometric methods we rely on to analyse the effect of the 
tax rate reductions on entrepreneurial choice. Our identification strategy for the treatment 
effect, the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) technique, is described in section 5.1. 
To control for observable covariates, most notably the important effect of the duration of an 
employment spell on the decision to switch employment state, we employ the DDD method 
within a discrete time hazard rate model, which will be derived in section 5.2. Additionally, 
we apply a selection model for the probability of being self-employed (section 5.3). In section 
5.4, we describe which control variables we chose and the motivation for this choice. 
5.1 Identification 
 
In this study we follow the “natural experiment approach”. As researchers cannot study the 
effects of taxation in a laboratory experiment, the basic idea of this strategy is to interpret a 
legislation reform itself as an experiment. It is crucial to find a naturally occurring comparison 
group which can mimic the properties of the control group in a randomized laboratory setting. 
If such a comparison group can be identified, one can compare the difference in average 
behaviour of the eligible group before and after the reform with the difference in behaviour of 
the comparison group. This “difference in difference” represents the average treatment effect 
on the treated, i.e. the average effect of the reform on those affected by the reform (see, for 
example, Blundell and Costa Dias 2000).  
The two tax reforms we exploit as natural experiments in this study were described in 
section 3. These legislation changes affected tradesmen with incomes above a certain 
threshold defined by the tax law and provided naturally identified comparison groups, namely 
freelance professionals and individuals with incomes below the threshold (see section 4.3). 
The outcome variables we are interested in are transitions into and out of self-employment 
and the decision to be self-employed. Applying the “difference-in-difference” (DD) approach 
in this context means to compare the difference in the average outcome variables of the high-
income tradesmen before and after each reform with the before and after contrast of the 
comparison groups to measure the average effect of the reforms on the high-income 
tradesmen, which is the average treatment effect on the treated. As the tax reforms we study 
provide two independent dimensions to distinguish the treatment group from the control 
groups, i.e. the separations by profession and by income, we can go beyond the simple DD 
approach and apply a “difference-in-difference-in-difference” (DDD) estimator (Gruber 
  241994). We implement the method in a regression framework to be able to control for 
observable covariates that affect the outcome variables of interest. This way we can account 
for observable differences between treatment and control groups (see section 4.4) and for 
changing compositions of these groups, and the efficiency of the estimated treatment effects is 
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  ( 1 ) 
In this equation, i indexes individuals and t indexes years. Prob(·) is the response probability 
(the outcome variable yit is a dummy indicating transition into or out of self-employment, or 
being self-employed, depending on the model). α is the intercept, Xit is the row vector of 
covariates, β is the corresponding column vector of coefficients, and εit is the error term. a to 
e denominate dummy variables ( = 0 in the base case): 
ait  = 1 if i is classified as a potential tradesman in t. 
bt  = 1 if t is after the 1994 reform and before the 1999 reform. 
cit  = 1 if i’s income in t is above the threshold defined in 1994. 
dt  = 1 if t is after the 1999 reform. 
eit  = 1 if i’s income in t is above the threshold defined in 1999. 
The second-level interactions control for differences in the behaviour of the treatment and 
control groups that are not due to the tax reforms we study. The linear effects in the 
interactions with b and d capture reform-independent differential time trends that affect all 
tradesmen or all high-income individuals, and the other interactions control for time-invariant 
differences between high-income tradesmen and other people. The coefficient of the third-
level interaction, δ7, is the DDD estimate of the impact of the 1994 reform. It captures the 
effect of the 1994 reform on the response probability of the treated, i.e. tradesmen with 
income above the 1994 threshold. To measure the impact of the 1999 reform as well, we 
include d and e and their interactions. δ13 is the DDD estimate of the cumulative effect of the 
1994 and the 1999 reforms. It represents the change in the response probability of tradesmen 
with income above the 1999 threshold after the 1999 reform. Using the Mikrozensus, we can 
  25only analyse the second reform because cross-sections in years before 1996 did not have 
information crucial to the analysis (see section 4.1).  
The identifying assumption of the DDD estimator is comparably weak: It requires that there 
be no time trend that affects tradesmen with income above the threshold in a different way 
than tradesmen and high income individuals in general. That means, if a contemporaneous 
shock affects all tradesmen, or if it affects all individuals with high income, our assumption is 
not violated, because the DDD method controls for such shocks. Other legislation changes 
that concerned companies, for example, affected all self-employed individuals and thus do not 
bias the DDD estimator. The identifying assumption includes the requirement that there be no 
systematic composition changes within the treatment and comparison groups. In our setting, 
these groups can change composition; individuals can switch groups when their income 
moves across the threshold, for example. There is no reason, though, to suspect such 
composition changes are systematic. More importantly, we can statistically control for 
composition changes due to observable characteristics in our regression framework. 
In principle, given these identifying assumptions, the model given by equation ( 1 ) could be 
estimated by the “ordinary least squares” (OLS) method. This approach has various 
shortcomings, however. The estimation of the coefficients would be inefficient because of the 
inherent heteroscedasticity of the error terms due to the binary dependent variable, and the 
data-coherency condition would be violated, since expected values of the dependent variable 
would fall outside the 0/1 interval. These limitations could be overcome by applying logit or 
probit models, but even then, the model would not be appropriate to study transitions between 
employment states since it does not account for censoring of observation periods. 
5.2 Econometric  specification 
 
Instead of the simple linear probability model given above for illustration, we implement 
hazard rate models to explain the transitions into and out of self-employment. This enables us 
to estimate the probability of a transition conditional on the duration of the current spell in 
self-employment, employment or unemployment/inactivity. Conceptually, the duration of 
these spells can be any integer number of days. We use yearly data, because interviews for 
both the SOEP and the Mikrozensus are conducted once a year, and the covariates are not 
available on a higher frequency. As the hazard rate is still small even in intervals of a year 
(see Table 2), a discrete time logistic hazard model based on years can be interpreted as an 
approximation for an underlying continuous time model in which the within-year durations 
follow a log-logistic distribution (Sueyoshi 1995). 
  26We model exit from self-employment and entry into self-employment analogously; in the 
following, a spell refers to a self-employment spell in the exit model and to an employment or 
unemployment/inactive spell in the entry model. Individuals can experience multiple spells in 
the observation period. The discrete non-negative random variable Tik describes the duration 
of the k-th spell of individual i. When a spell terminates in year t (measured from the 
beginning of the spell), Tik takes on the value Tik = t. The hazard rate λik(t) is defined as the 
probability that spell k of person i ends in period t, i.e. a transition occurs
14, conditional on 
survival until the beginning of t: 
() ( () , , () , ik i ik ik i tX t PT tT tX t ) λ ε == ≥ ε . (  2  ) 
where Xi(t) is a vector of characteristics of individual i in interval t, including the DDD 
dummy variables a-e and their interactions as described in section 5.1, and ε  is a time-
invariant individual effect. 
The probability of remaining in the current spell (“survival”) in period t, conditional on 
having survived until the beginning of t, is the complementary probability 
() ( ) ,( ) , 1 ( ) , ik ik i ik i PT tT tX t tX t ε λ >≥ = − ε . (  3  ) 
The survivor function, which gives the unconditional probability of remaining in the current 
spell until the end of period t, can be written as the product of the survival probabilities in all 
periods before and in t: 




ii k i i k i StX PT tX X
τ ) ) ( ) , ε ελ τ τ
=
=> = − ∏ ε . (  4 ) 
Consequently, the unconditional probability of a transition in period t is the probability of 
survival until the beginning of period t multiplied by the hazard rate in period t:  
() () ( (
1
1
, ( ), 1 ( ),
t
ik i ik i ik i PT tX tX t X
τ ) ) ε λε λ τ τ
−
=
== − ∏ ε
                                                
. (  5  ) 
We employ the maximum likelihood method to estimate the model. For a spell completed 
with a transition into or out of self-employment (in the entry or exit model, respectively), the 
contribution to the likelihood function is given by equation ( 5 ). For a right-censored spell, 
i.e. we only know that a person “survived” till the end of the observation period, but do not 
know when the spell will end, the likelihood contribution is given by the survivor 
function  (  4  ). Combining these two cases, the likelihood contribution of a spell k of an 
individual i can be written as 
 
14 In the entry model, a transition from employment to unemployed/inactive or vice versa is treated as censored, 
because we are only interested in transitions to self-employment. 
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where cik is a censoring indicator defined such that cik = 1 if a spell is completed and cik = 0 if 
a spell is right-censored. If a spell is left-censored in the SOEP, i.e person i enters the panel 
after the spell k has already lasted uik years, we have to condition on survival up to the end of 
period uik, which means dividing expression ( 6 ) by S(uik). Then the likelihood contribution 
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 (  7  ) 
Note that this more general notation includes equation ( 6 ) for spells that are not left censored 
(uik=0). In the SOEP, the retrospective employment history questions enable us to recover uik 
for self-employment and employment spells, so we do not have a left-censoring problem.
15
The overall likelihood contribution of an individual i is the product of the likelihood 
contributions of the Ki spells he experienced in the observation period, and the sample 
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We define a new binary indicator variable yikτ = 1 if person i completes spell k in period τ, 
and yikτ = 0 otherwise. The yikτ correspond to the transition dummy variables introduced in 
section 4.2. Effectively adding some zeros to the sum, we can write 
                                                 
15 For unemployment spells, however, we do not know how much time the unemployment period has lasted if a 
person is already unemployed when first entering the panel, so here a potential left censoring problem remains. 
For simplification, we assume the unemployment spell starts with entry into the panel in these cases. Moreover, 
if a person switched jobs within dependent employment or self-employment before entering the panel, the only 
information we have is the time passed since the job change, but not the duration of the overall spell in 
dependent employment or self-employment, respectively. We assume such job changes without changing the 









log log 1 ( ),
1( ) ,
log ( ), (1 )log 1 ( ),







ik u ik u ik i
Kt N
ik ik i ik ik i
ik u













λτ τε λτ τε
== = + == = +
== = +
⎡⎤
⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎢⎥ − ⎣ ⎦ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ =+ − − ⎣⎦ ⎣
∑∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ⎤ ⎦
  ( 10 ) 
The last expression has exactly the same form as the standard likelihood function for a binary 
regression model in which yikτ is the dependent variable and in which the data is organised in 
person-period format. This derivation represents a generalisation of the “easy estimation 
method” available for discrete time hazard models (see Jenkins, 1995) with respect to 
multiple spell data. 
Even conditional on the explanatory variables, all observations for a given individual, both 
within and between spells, can be expected to be correlated due to the individual effect ε, 
which represents the unobserved heterogeneity in the population that is not controlled for by 
the included control variables. This unobserved heterogeneity could, for example, relate to the 
ability to be an entrepreneur, attitude towards risk and the motivation to be independent. We 
specify the individual effect ε in a nonparametric way and assume an arbitrary discrete 
probability distribution with a small number M of mass points εm with the probabilities P(εm) 
(cf. Heckman and Singer, 1984, and Steiner, 2001). Here, we assume M = 2 mass points for 
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We estimate the mass points εm and their probabilities P(εm) jointly with the parameters of the 
model by adjusting the likelihood function: 
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  ( 12 ) 
This maximum likelihood function is valid under the assumption that all observations are 
independent conditional on the explanatory variables and the individual effect. 
We still have to specify the functional form of the hazard rate. We choose a logistic hazard 
model. As mentioned before, this model is consistent with an underlying continuous time 
  29model in which the within-interval durations follow a log-logistic distribution. The hazard rate 
is specified as 
  () ()
()
exp ( ) ( )
() ,













                                                
,  ( 13 ) 
where the function f(t) represents the dependence of the hazard rate on the spell duration 
(baseline hazard) which we specify as a polynomial function of the third degree. Given the 
logit specification of the hazard rate, the likelihood function ( 12 ) can be maximised with 
respect to the coefficients of the baseline hazard, the explanatory variables, and the mass 
points and their respective probabilities, subject to the constraints on the individual effects, by 
standard numerical optimisation procedures.
16
As mentioned in section 4.1, using the Mikrozensus, no information about the duration of a 
spell is available. Hence, in contrast to the SOEP, we have to assume that the hazard rate does 
not depend on spell duration, i.e. the coefficients of the baseline hazard are assumed to be 
zero. Moreover, as we observe each individual in a single cross-section only, we do not need 
to control for individual heterogeneity and exclude ε from the model specification. As a 
result, the model estimated on the basis of the Mikrozensus is equivalent to a simple binary 
logit model. 
5.3  Self-employment Selection Model 
 
We use the hazard rate models described above to estimate transition rates into and out of 
self-employment. In principle, the long-term equilibrium self-employment rate can be 
calculated based on the flows into and out of self-employment. As a consistency check of our 
estimations of the transition rates, we decided to additionally estimate the probability of being 
self-employed in a given year. This enables us to estimate the short term effect of the 
variables, especially the DDD variables, on the self-employment rate directly. 
For the analysis of the probability of being self-employed, we include the dependently 
employed, the self-employed, the unemployed and the inactive individuals in the sample. We 
specify a logit model of binary choice. Using the SOEP, again we control for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity nonparametrically with two mass points, as described in section 
5.2. As additional explanatory variables we include dummies indicating the employment 
status in the year prior to the interview. 
 
16 We use the Stata programme gllamm version 2.3.10. for the estimations. A descriptions of gllamm is provided 
by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2004). 
  305.4 Motivation  of  Variables 
 
The descriptive statistics in section 4.4 revealed that there are important observable 
differences between the treatment and comparison groups. It is thus necessary to control for 
these differences in the econometric models, as explained in section 5.1. Due to different 
sample designs in the SOEP and the Mikrozensus, some of the variables we include are 
defined differently in the two datasets, and some variables are only included in one of the 
datasets; see Table A 2 and Table A 3 in the appendix for a list of the chosen explanatory 
variables and their exact definitions. In both datasets, we include age and its square, the 
number of children, and dummy variables indicating gender, location in eastern Germany, 
marital status, education and professional qualification. Using the SOEP, we generate 
variables representing full time and part time work experience and unemployment experience 
in years and their square terms. By including this information, we account for the view that 
work experience builds up human capital, while unemployment experience might devaluate it. 
Importantly, these effects might have a different impact on self-employment than on 
dependent employment (Niefert 2005). Using the Mikrozensus, we add some different control 
variables: employment status of the respondent’s spouse and the spouse’s income (if the 
respondent is married), other household income, and the size of the respondent’s residence 
city in the year prior to interview (to avoid the potential endogeneity of the city size).
17
In the SOEP-based hazard rate models of transition into and out of self-employment, we 
include the duration of the spell in the current employment state (see section 5.2). In the 
Mikrozensus, the only information provided is the employment state in the previous year. 
Note that in the model of exit from self-employment, the current spell is necessarily a self-
employment spell, while in the model of entry into self-employment, we distinguish between 
the possible spell types before entering self-employment: “employed” or 
“unemployed/inactive”, as the base category, in the SOEP; and “employed”, “inactive”, or 
“unemployed”, as the base category, in the Mikrozensus. 
In the model of the probability of being self-employed, the sample additionally contains those 
who were self-employed in the year prior to the interview, and those for whom no information 
about last year’s employment status is available (in the Mikrozensus). Using the Mikrozensus, 
this means the categories “self-employed in the previous year” and “no information” are 
                                                 
17 Liquidity constraints are another potentially important factor in the decision to be an entrepreneur, as pointed 
out by an extensive literature, e.g. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Schäfer and Talavera (2005). Neither the 
SOEP nor the Mikrozensus provide unproblematic information about a respondent’s wealth, however. Home 
ownership could be used as a proxy for wealth, for example, but we decide not to include this or similar 
variables because such wealth indicators are potentially endogenous. 
  31added to the categories already included in the entry model. Using the SOEP, for this model 
we include dummy variables indicating the employment state in the previous year 




6 Estimation  Results 
 
As described above, we estimated three models: The probability of exit from self-
employment, the probability of entry into self-employment and the probability of being self-
employed. Each model was estimated both with the SOEP and the Mikrozensus datasets. 
Table 6 reports the results based on the SOEP, and Table 7 the results based on the 
Mikrozensus. The left three columns of the tables show the logit coefficients of the three 
different models (exit, entry and self-employed status) and their robust standard errors. The 
right three columns provide the estimated marginal effects for the three models, evaluated at 
the respective sample means. The marginal effects indicate the change in the estimated 
probabilities in percentage points (“0.01” in the table means “1%”), given an increase of the 
corresponding explanatory variable by one unit if the variable is measured on a metric scale; 
for dummy variables, the “marginal” effects measure the probability change corresponding to 
a discrete switch of the variable from zero to one.
19 When interpreting the economic 
significance of the marginal effects, it is useful to relate them to the magnitude of the overall 
probabilities. The corresponding means of the outcome variables in the two data samples are 
given in Table 2. For the exact definitions of the explanatory variables, see Table A 2 and 
Table A 3 in the appendix. 
 
                                                 
18 Consequently, here we can only include person-year observations for which another observation of the same 
individual in the previous year is available. This introduces left truncation in the model of the probability of 
being self-employed using the SOEP, which means that those who frequently switch between employment states 
are potentially underrepresented in this model. 
19 The interaction effects are calculated as double or triple differences, as pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003). 
The corresponding standard errors are found by applying the Delta method. 
  32Table 6: Self-employment transition and state probabilities: Logit estimation results and 
marginal effects (SOEP 1984-2001) 
  exit: logit coeff.  entry: logit coeff.  state: logit coeff.  exit: marg. eff.  entry: marg. eff.  state: marg. eff. 
a: tradesman
1 -0.261 0.222  -1.299  -0.026  0.002  -0.028 
 (0.243)  (0.293)  (0.191)***  (0.025)  (0.002)  (0.007)*** 
b: after 94 reform
1 0.437 0.373  -0.417 0.044  0.004 -0.004 
 (0.448)  (0.394)  (0.282)  (0.046)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
c: threshold 94
1 -0.044 -0.005  0.516  -0.004  -0.000 0.007 
 (0.961)  (0.419)  (0.295)  (0.092)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
a x b
2 -0.144 -0.178  0.375  -0.020  -0.002 0.012 
 (0.348)  (0.362)  (0.244)  (0.038)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
b x c
2 -0.329 -0.934  -0.286  -0.034  -0.009 -0.006 
 (1.279)  (0.893)  (0.472)  (0.120)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
a x c
2 0.235 0.320  -0.259 0.023  0.004 -0.020 
 (1.093)  (0.460)  (0.326)  (0.113)  (0.004)  (0.016) 
a x b x c (DDD 94)
2 0.320 0.791  0.270  0.039  0.006 0.017 
 (1.436)  (0.939)  (0.512)  (0.149)  (0.007)  (0.018) 
d: after 99 reform
1 0.594 0.280  0.266  0.062  0.003 0.003 
 (0.452)  (0.493)  (0.312)  (0.050)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
e: threshold 99
1 -2.483 0.673  0.170  -0.172  0.008  0.002 
 (0.795)**  (0.380)  (0.270)  (0.038)***  (0.006)  (0.003) 
a x d
2 -0.241 -0.375  -0.125  -0.033  -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.385)  (0.471)  (0.295)  (0.044)  (0.005)  (0.012) 
d x e
2 -0.155 -0.643  -0.388  -0.064  -0.008 -0.005 
 (1.020)  (0.700)  (0.422)  (0.063)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
a x e
2 0.826 -0.692  0.413  0.051  -0.008  0.002 
 (0.888)  (0.407)  (0.289)  (0.038)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
a x d x e (DDD 99)
2 -0.314 0.796  0.542  0.019 0.009  0.019 
 (1.205)  (0.745)  (0.455)  (0.066)  (0.009)  (0.016) 
female
1 0.453 -0.425  -0.828 0.046  -0.004  -0.010 
 (0.194)*  (0.086)***  (0.077)***  (0.020)*  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
east
1 -0.533 -0.361  0.026  -0.048  -0.003 0.000 
 (0.213)*  (0.102)***  (0.079)  (0.018)**  (0.001)***  (0.001) 
highschool
1 -0.324 0.252  0.445  -0.031  0.003  0.006 
 (0.227)  (0.112)*  (0.092)***  (0.021)  (0.001)*  (0.001)*** 
apprenticeship
1 0.102 0.106  0.131  0.010  0.001 0.001 
 (0.212)  (0.091)  (0.081)  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
highertechncol
1 -0.337 0.424  0.537  -0.032  0.005  0.007 
 (0.236)  (0.108)***  (0.090)***  (0.021)  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
university
1 0.207 0.460  0.149  0.021  0.005 0.002 
 (0.247)  (0.126)***  (0.102)  (0.025)  (0.002)**  (0.001) 
age -0.181  0.214  0.096  -0.018  0.002  0.001 
 (0.073)*  (0.033)***  (0.030)**  (0.007)*  (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
agesq 0.002  -0.003  -0.001  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001)*  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
ftexp10 -0.508  -0.011  0.333  -0.049  -0.000  0.004 
 (0.334)  (0.152)  (0.129)*  (0.032)  (0.001)  (0.001)* 
ftexpsq100 0.037  -0.012  -0.025  0.004 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.075)  (0.040)  (0.030)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ptexp10 -0.258  1.427 0.915  -0.025  0.013  0.010 
 (0.631)  (0.278)***  (0.228)***  (0.061)  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
ptexpsq100 -0.127  -0.718  -0.295  -0.012 -0.007  -0.003 
 (0.316)  (0.168)***  (0.118)*  (0.031)  (0.002)***  (0.001)* 
unemexp10 2.986  0.608  -1.718  0.290  0.006  -0.020 
 (1.422)*  (0.634)  (0.527)**  (0.139)*  (0.006)  (0.006)** 
unemexpsq100 -1.712  -1.450  0.007  -0.166  -0.014  0.000 
 (2.075)  (1.008)  (0.781)  (0.202)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
disabled
1 0.035 -0.323  -0.538 0.003  -0.003  -0.005 
 (0.465)  (0.172)  (0.151)***  (0.046)  (0.001)*  (0.001)*** 
german
1 -0.105 0.039  0.089  -0.010  0.000  0.001 
 (0.321)  (0.139)  (0.131)  (0.033)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
nchild -0.010  0.089  -0.014  -0.001  0.001  -0.000 
 (0.090)  (0.038)*  (0.035)  (0.009)  (0.000)*  (0.000) 
married
1 0.227 0.096  -0.181 0.022  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.222)  (0.104)  (0.091)*  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
separated
1 0.150 0.566  0.361  0.015  0.007 0.005 
 (0.461)  (0.217)**  (0.200)  (0.048)  (0.003)*  (0.003) 
divorced
1 0.466 -0.055  0.073  0.049  -0.001  0.001 
 (0.306)  (0.168)  (0.133)  (0.035)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
fatherse
1 -0.592 0.637  0.638  -0.053  0.008  0.010 
 (0.206)**  (0.108)***  (0.090)***  (0.017)**  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
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  exit: logit coeff.  entry: logit coeff.  state: logit coeff.  exit: marg. eff.  entry: marg. eff.  state: marg. eff. 
empl
1  -0.130  -1.320    -0.001  -0.021 
   (0.173)  (0.092)***    (0.002)  (0.002)*** 
selfemplpy
1    4.720     0.394 
     (0.093)***      (0.021)*** 
duration -0.127 -0.411    -0.012  -0.004  
 (0.055)*  (0.126)**    (0.005)*  (0.001)***   
dur_sq 0.008  0.038   0.001  0.000   
 (0.004)*  (0.021)    (0.000)*  (0.000)   
dur_p3 -0.000  -0.001   -0.000  -0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.001)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
dur_e   0.088      0.001   
   (0.131)      (0.001)   
dur_sq_e   -0.021      -0.000   
   (0.021)      (0.000)   
dur_p3_e   0.001      0.000   
   (0.001)      (0.000)   
_cons 2.928  -8.783  -4.746       
 (1.371)*  (0.671)***  (0.588)***       
ε1 -0.882 -0.326  -0.790  0.054 0.004  0.004 
 (0.159)***  (0.077)***  (0.169)***  (0.009)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)*** 
π1
3 0.670 1.954  0.452       
 (0.268)*  (0.263)***  (0.306)       








Robust standard errors in paranthesis. Year dummies also included, but not shown for brevity.  
1 marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
2 marginals are double difference (triple difference, respectively) 
3 log-odd of probability P(ε1) 
4 currently self-employed individuals, waves 1984-2000 
5 individuals who are not currently self-employed, waves 1984-2000 
6 individuals whose employment status in the previous year (t-1) is observed, waves 1984-2001 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  34Table 7: Self-employment transition and state probabilities: Logit estimation results and 
marginal effects (Mikrozensus 1996-2001) 
  exit: logit coeff.  entry: logit coeff.  state: logit coeff.  exit: marg. eff.  entry: marg. eff.  state: marg. eff. 
a: tradesman
1 1.036  -1.006 -1.058 0.068  -0.013 -0.022 
  (0.080)*** (0.046)*** (0.036)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
d: after 99 reform
1 0.016 0.038 -0.019  0.001 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.132) (0.077) (0.060) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
e: threshold 99
1 -0.651 -0.158 0.028  -0.045 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.175)*** (0.078)*  (0.061)  (0.010)*** (0.001)*  (0.001) 
a x d
2 0.172  -0.019 -0.055 0.018  -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.128) (0.076) (0.059) (0.007)**  (0.001) (0.002) 
d x e
2 -0.175  0.109 0.062 -0.009  0.001 0.001 
  (0.308) (0.116) (0.092) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) 
a x e
2 -0.506 -0.021 -0.131 -0.061 0.002  -0.002 
  (0.200)*  (0.092) (0.071) (0.007)***  (0.001) (0.002) 
a x d x e (DDD 99)
2 -0.045 -0.203 -0.127 -0.019 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.348) (0.145) (0.110) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) 
female
1 0.469  -0.765 -0.743 0.042  -0.006 -0.010 
  (0.036)*** (0.028)*** (0.020)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
east
1 -0.147 -0.449 -0.267 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.043)*** (0.033)*** (0.022)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
age  -0.224  0.118 0.176 -0.018  0.001 0.002 
  (0.012)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
agesqr  0.002  -0.001 -0.002 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
schoolna
1 -0.456  0.454 0.464 -0.032  0.004 0.007 
  (0.094)*** (0.057)*** (0.037)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
gymnasium
1 -0.348  0.686 0.564 -0.027  0.007 0.009 
  (0.062)*** (0.047)*** (0.035)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
realschule
1 -0.283  0.384 0.334 -0.023  0.003 0.005 
  (0.041)*** (0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
qualifna
1 0.050 0.206 0.090 0.004 0.002 0.001 
  (0.051) (0.040)***  (0.028)**  (0.004) (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
mastercraft
1 -0.791  0.780 0.796 -0.054  0.009 0.015 
  (0.054)*** (0.038)*** (0.027)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
advtechncol
1 0.174 0.265 0.124 0.015 0.002 0.002 
  (0.072)* (0.054)***  (0.041)**  (0.007)* (0.001)***  (0.001)** 
university
1 -0.024  0.507 0.399 -0.002  0.005 0.006 
  (0.076)  (0.053)*** (0.041)*** (0.006)  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
german
1 -0.123  0.001 0.106 -0.011  0.000 0.001 
  (0.065) (0.050) (0.038)**  (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)** 
nchild17  0.016 0.053 0.031 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.019) (0.015)***  (0.011)**  (0.002) (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
married
1 0.299  -0.589 -0.484 0.023  -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.418) (0.452) (0.267) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004) 
spouseinc1000  -0.018  0.088 0.083 -0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (0.020)  (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
spouseworkna
1 -0.310 -0.120 0.041  -0.024 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.418) (0.453) (0.268) (0.031) (0.003) (0.004) 
spouseworking
1 -0.876  0.418 0.538 -0.075  0.003 0.007 
  (0.044)*** (0.038)*** (0.026)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
othrinc1000  0.015 0.010 -0.006  0.001 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
medcity
1 0.109  -0.006 -0.080 0.009  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.036)**  (0.026)  (0.019)***  (0.003)**  (0.000)  (0.000)*** 
bigcity
1 0.227 0.164 0.034 0.020 0.001 0.000 
  (0.047)*** (0.034)*** (0.025)  (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) 
employedpy
1   -0.285 -0.260   -0.002 -0.003 
    (0.043)*** (0.041)***   (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
notemplpy
1   -1.078 -1.077   -0.007 -0.011 
    (0.058)*** (0.055)***   (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
emplstatepyna
1   1.751    0.054 
    (0.043)***    (0.003)*** 
selfemplpy
1   5.936    0.772 
    (0.041)***    (0.007)*** 
_cons  2.792  -5.533 -7.129      
  (0.498)*** (0.493)*** (0.308)***      






Robust standard errors in paranthesis. Year dummies also included, but not shown for brevity. 
1 marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
2 marginals are double difference (triple difference, respectively) 
3 individuals who were self-employed in the previous year (t-1)  
4 individuals who were dependently employed, unemployed or inactive in the previous year (t-1) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The variables of primary interest are the interaction dummy variables whose coefficients are 
the DDD estimates of the tax reform effects. For the 1994 tax reform, the relevant interaction 
variable is a x b x c (DDD 94) (available only in the SOEP estimation), and for the 1999 
reform, it is the variable a x d x e (DDD 99). The coefficients of these variables capture the 
average treatment effect on the treated, i.e. the impact of the top marginal tax rate limitation 
on tradesmen with income above the threshold. The coefficient of the a x d x e (DDD 99) 
variable represents the cumulative effect of both the 1994 and the 1999 reforms, because the 
dummy variables for the periods after the 1994 and the 1999 reforms are defined 
consecutively and do not overlap. Formally, to calculate the additional effect of the 1999 
reform, one has to subtract the marginal effect of the a x b x c (DDD 94) dummy from the 
marginal effect of the a x d x e (DDD 99) dummy. 
In none of the estimations, any of the coefficients of the DDD variables are significant at the 
10% level. The two DDD coefficients corresponding to the reforms in 1994 and 1999 in the 
SOEP models are not jointly significant either (p-values 46% and more). We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the two tax reforms had no effect on the entry rate, the exit rate or the 
overall self-employment rate of those affected by the reforms. In case of the SOEP, it could 
be argued that the significance tests fail due to the relatively small sample size; especially the 
number of transitions per year in the treatment group is small. The Mikrozensus, however, 
provides a large number of observations, and the effects remain insignificant. This adds 
evidence to the conclusion that the tax reforms did not affect transitions into and out of self-
employment and thus also had no significant effect on the total number of the self-
employed.
20
Our general finding that taxes are insignificant for entrepreneurial choice is in line with two 
recent studies: Schuetze and Bruce (2004) reviewed the literature and concluded that there is 
little support for the view that lower taxes for the self-employed promote entrepreneurship; 
and Parker (2003) also re-assessed the existing literature and additionally analysed British 
micro-data, concluding that “it could not even be robustly established that the self-employed 
respond to pecuniary incentives generally, let alone tax-related ones specifically”. Our 
                                                 
20 As an additional robustness test, we repeated the three estimations using the full sample of the Mikrozensus; as 
mentioned before, the retrospective question about last year’s employment status is only available in the 45% 
sub-sample used in the remainder of this paper. The coefficients of the DDD variables in the estimations of exits 
and entries remain insignificant. Only in the estimation of the probability of being self-employment, the 
coefficient of the DDD variable becomes positive and significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level, with a 
marginal effect of 0.2 percentage points. Given that the sub-sample is selected at random, and considering that 
the flows remain insignificant, we have no explanation for this finding. 
  36empirical finding is also a plausible reflection of the theoretical ambiguity regarding the effect 
of a differential tax treatment on entrepreneurial choice, as outlined in section 2.1. 
The estimation results indicate that personal characteristics other than taxation are more 
important determinants of the decision to be self-employed. Everything else equal, higher age 
both increases the probability of entering into self-employment and the probability of being 
self-employed (until a certain age, with decreasing marginal rates). Both the positive linear 
and the negative square terms are significant at least at the 1% level based on both the SOEP 
and the Mikrozensus. The hazard of exit from self-employment is found to decrease with age 
(until a certain age again, with decreasing absolute margins). The significance level is 0.1% 
using the Mikrozensus and 5% using the SOEP; the lower significance level in the SOEP 
could be explained by the fact that the “work experience” and “spell duration” covariates, 
which are correlated with age, are also included, and by the smaller sample size.  
Gender effects are also evident and consistent in all models (dummy variable female). Women 
have lower probabilities of both entering self-employment and being self-employed, and self-
employed women are shown to have a higher probability of leaving self-employment. All 
these effects are highly significant
21 except for exit from self-employment in the SOEP 
estimation, which is significant only at the 5% level. The marginal effects at the sample 
means indicate the economic significance. Ceteris paribus, the probability of entering self-
employment is 0.4 percentage points lower for women than for men estimated on the SOEP, 
and 0.6 percentage points lower estimated on the Mikrozensus. Compared to the average 
probability of entering self-employment in a given year of 1.31 % and 1.15 %, respectively, 
these are relatively large effects.
22  
Having a university degree c.p. highly significantly increases the propensity of entering self-
employment by 0.5 percentage points in both datasets. In the Mikrozensus, the probability of 
being self-employed is also positively influenced by a university degree; in the SOEP, this is 
not significant. 
Key variables in the hazard rate models are those related to the duration of the spell in the 
current employment state. This information is only available in the SOEP. In the model of exit 
from self-employment, the coefficient of the duration variable is negative and significant and 
that of its square term dur_sq is positive and significant, indicating that the hazard of exit first 
                                                 
21 With “highly significant” we refer to a significance level of 0.1%. 
22 Note that marginal effects may differ between the two datasets because mean values of explanatory variables 
are, in some cases, quite different in magnitude in the SOEP and the Mikrozensus, partly due to different 
observation periods. Differences in marginal effects could, however, also be related to misspecification of the 
models estimated on the Mikrozensus data, because due to data limitations we cannot control for duration 
dependence effects.  
  37decreases with the duration of the self-employment spell and later increases. The term of the 
duration variable to the power of three (dur_p3) is not significant.
23
In the model of entry into self-employment, the individuals at risk can be in one of two 
different spell types: they can be dependently employed or unemployed/inactive, where 
unemployed/inactive is the base category. The dummy variable empl equals one if an 
individual is dependently employed. The duration, dur_sq and dur_p3 variables capture the 
spell duration, regardless of whether the spell is an employment or an unemployment/inactive 
spell. The variables dur_e,  dur_sq_e and dur_p3_e are interaction variables of the respective 
duration variables and the empl dummy. The estimation results reveal that the coefficient of 
the  duration variable is negative and significant, which indicates state dependence. The 
interactions with empl are insignificant. Thus, irrespective of whether a spell is an 
employment or an unemployment/inactive spell, the more years a person has stayed in a 
certain state, the less likely he or she is to enter self-employment. 
In the SOEP model of the probability of being self-employed in year t, instead of the duration 
variables we included variables indicating the employment state in the previous year t-1, 
where unemployed/inactive is the base category. The coefficient of selfemplpy, the dummy 
indicating that the individual was self-employed in t-1, is positive and highly significant, 
indicating state dependence of self-employment. The coefficient of the dummy variable empl, 
which indicates that the individual was dependently employed in t-1 in this model, is negative 
and highly significant, showing that employees in t-1 are c.p. less likely to be self-employed 
in t than those unemployed or inactive in t-1. 
In the Mikrozensus data, we do not observe the duration of spells in a certain employment 
state, but only the employment state in t-1, so we included corresponding dummy variables in 
the Mikrozensus models. In the model of entry into self-employment, the possible 
employment states in t-1 are dependent employment (dummy variable employedpy), inactivity 
(dummy notemplpy) and unemployment (base category). The coefficients of the employedpy 
and  notemplpy dummies are negative and highly significant, indicating that entry from 
employment and inactivity is less likely than from unemployment, everything else equal. This 
is a different result than that of the SOEP model of entry, where the empl dummy and its 
interactions are insignificant, perhaps due to the smaller sample size. In the Mikrozensus 
model of the probability of being self-employed in t, two more employment state categories in 
t-1 are possible, “self-employment” (dummy variable selfemplpy) and “no information” 
(dummy emplstatepyna); again, unemployment is the base category. All dummy variables 
                                                 
23 The sign and significance level of the linear duration effect do not change if the terms of higher order are 
excluded from the estimation. 
  38indicating the employment status in t-1 are highly significant. The sign of the selfemplpy 
dummy is positive, confirming the finding in the SOEP model that self-employment is state 
dependent. The signs of the employedpy and notemplpy dummies are negative, which is 
consistent with the results of the entry model which showed that entry from employment or 
inactivity is c.p. less likely than from unemployment, and also with the SOEP model of the 




In this paper we have studied the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship by providing an 
integrated view on the probability of entry into self-employment, exit from self-employment, 
and the resulting overall propensity of being self-employed. We exploited two German tax 
reforms in 1994 and 1999/2000 as natural experiments to identify responses to taxes. These 
legislative changes represented tax rate limitation for income from trade (Tarifbegrenzung für 
gewerbliche Einkünfte) and were implemented to promote small and medium sized 
enterprises. The top marginal income tax rates were limited exclusively for self-employed 
tradesmen, but not for the alternative sector, i.e. wage and salary employment, introducing a 
differential tax treatment. Moreover, the tax reforms provided two naturally defined 
comparison groups which were not affected by the reforms, the so-called freelance 
professionals and tradesmen with income below a certain threshold defined by the tax law, 
enabling us to apply a “difference-in-difference-in-difference” estimator to isolate the effect 
of the reforms. We used two different large and high quality datasets from Germany: the 
German Socio Economic Panel  (SOEP) and the Mikrozensus (Labour Force Survey). Using 
the SOEP, we applied discrete time hazard models to control for the important effect of the 
duration of a spell in the certain employment state. 
The results based on both datasets consistently show that the two German tax reforms did not 
have a significant effect on transition rates into or out of self-employment, or on the overall 
self-employment rate. Thus, the tax reforms do not seem to have fostered entrepreneurship. In 
contrast, individual characteristics, such as age, gender and education, have significant effects 
in most cases. Duration dependence is shown to be an important factor. The hazard of exit 
from self-employment decreases during the first years of being self-employed. Likewise, 
longer employment, unemployment or inactivity spells reduce the probability of entry into 
self-employment. 
  39Intuitively, the finding that the differential tax treatment of the self-employed does not 
significantly influence the choice between self-employment and dependent employment might 
be surprising. Both theoretical and empirical literature, however, indicate that the direction of 
the effect is ambiguous, if there is an effect at all. On the one hand, proportional taxes may 
harm entrepreneurship by reducing the expected return on a risky entrepreneurial project, but 
on the other hand, they may encourage entrepreneurship by serving as insurance against the 
uncertainty of income from self-employment. If the effect of taxation depends on individual 
preferences such as attitude towards risk, it is possible that the aggregate effect is zero. Recent 
reviews of the existing literature about the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship are also in 
line with our results. Parker (2003) concluded that the self-employed do not seem to respond 
to tax-related incentives, and Schuetze and Bruce (2004) came to the conclusion that “the 
literature appears to provide little support for the common view that taxes should be lower for 
the self-employed”. 
For policy makers who wish to promote entrepreneurship, these results may suggest that 
taxation is not a suitable policy instrument to meet the intended objective; alternative 
instruments may be required. As the results in this research area are still tentative, more 
research is needed to provide clear evidence-based policy advice with regard to taxes and 
entrepreneurship. A better understanding of the roles played by the influence of taxes on the 
average return and on the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity may help clarify the 
picture of the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship. 
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  43Appendix 
 
Table A 1: Freelance professions 
In the SOEP, we classify the following professions as freelance professions: 
  
ISCO-88 Code  Profession(s) 
2113 Chemists 
2121  Mathematicians and related professionals 
2141  Architects, town and traffic planners 
2142 Civil  engineers 
2148  Cartographers and surveyors 
2149  Architects, engineers and related professionals not elsewhere classified 
2211  Biologists, botanists, zoologists and related professionals 
2221 Medical  doctors 
2222 Dentists 
2223 Veterinarians 
2230  Nursing and midwifery professionals 
2411 Accountants 
2419  Business professionals not elsewhere classified 
2421 Lawyers 
2441 Economists 
2444  Philologists, translators and interpreters 
2445 Psychologists 
2451  Authors, journalists and other writers 
2452  Sculptors, painters and related artists 
2453  Composers, musicians and singers 
2454  Choreographers and dancers 
2455  Film, stage and related actors and directors 
3131  Photographers and image and sound recording equipment operators 
3144  Air traffic controllers 
3226  Physiotherapists and related associate professionals 
3232  Midwifery associate professionals 
3241 Traditional  medicine  practitioners 
  
In the Mikrozensus, we classify the following professions as freelance professions: 
  
Value Number  Profession(s) 
600  Engineers without further specification 
603 Civil  engineers 
604  Cartographers and surveyors 
608 Other  engineers 
609 Architects 
611  Chemists and method engineers 
753  Accountants and related professionals 
757  Business consultants and related professionals 
813  Legal representatives and advisors 
821 Publicists 
822  Translators and interpreters 
831 Musicians 
832  Visual artists and singers 
833  Artists (fine art) 
834  Artists (applied art) 
835  Professions related to stage, image and sound 
837 Photographers  and  cinematographers 
841 Medical  doctors 
842 Dentists 
843 Veterinarians 
851 Alternative  practitioners 
852  Masseurs, balneotherapists and physiotherapists 
853  Nursing and midwifery professionals 
863 Educators 




  44Table A 2: Definition of variables (SOEP) 
Variable Definition 
DDD variables:  
a  Dummy for individuals classified as a potential tradesman in t 
b  Dummy for years after the 1994 reform and before the 1999 reform 
c  Dummy for individuals whose income in t is above the threshold defined in 1994
d  Dummy for years after the 1999 reform 
e  Dummy for individuals whose income in t is above the threshold defined in 1999
Other covariates:  
female Dummy  for  females 
east  Dummy for individuals who live in one of the 5 new eastern federal states or East 
Berlin 
highschool  Dummy for individuals who have a high school degree ("Fachhochschulreife" or 
"Abitur") 
apprenticeship  Dummy for individuals who finished an apprenticeship ("Lehre") 
highertechnical  Dummy for individuals who finished a higher technichal college or similar 
("Berufsschule", "Schule Gesundheitswesen", "Fachschule", "Meister", 
"Beamtenausbildung", or "Sonstige Ausbildung") 
university  Dummy for individuals who have a university degree 
age  Age of individual 
agesqr Age  squared 
ftexp10  Years of full time work experience. Uses information from the lifetime 
empoyment history in the SOEP (see text for details). Divided by 10. 
ftexpsq100  Fill time work experience squared and divided by 100 
ptexp10  Years of part time work experience. Uses information from the lifetime 
empoyment history in the SOEP (see text for details). Divided by 10. 
ptexpsq100  Part time work experience squared and divided by 100 
unemexp10  Years of unemployement experience. Uses information from the lifetime 
empoyment history in the SOEP (see text for details). Divided by 10. 
unemexpsq100  Unemployment experience squared and divided by 100 
disabled  Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals 
german  Dummy for German nationality 
nchild  Number of children under 17 in the household 
married  Dummy for married and not separated individuals. Omitted category for marital 
status is "single"/"widowed". 
separated  Dummy for married, but separated individuals 
divorced  Dummy for divorced individuals  
fatherse  Dummy for individuals whose father is/was self-employed 
empl  Entry model: Dummy for individuals who are employed in t 
Self-employment state model: Dummy for individuals who were employed in t-1
selfemplpy  Dummy for individuals who were self-employed in t-1 
duration  Duration of current spell (self-employment or employment). Uses information 
from lifetime job biography in the SOEP (see text for details). 
dur_sq  Square of duration variable 
dur_p3  Duration variable to the power of 3 
dur_e  Interaction variable of duration and empl 
dur_sq_e Interaction  variable of dur_sq and empl 
dur_p3_e  Interaction variable of dur_p3_e and empl 
Dummy variables are equal to one if condition holds and zero otherwise. 
 
  45Table A 3: Definition of variables (Mikrozensus, if different from SOEP) 
Variable Definition 
Highest school leaving degree achieved
schoolna  Dummy for no information, or not applicable 
gymnasium  Dummy for individuals with university entrance diploma ("Fachabitur" or 
"Abitur") 
realschule Qualification  for  entrance in advanced technical college ("Allg. polytech. 
Oberschulabschluss (ehem. DDR)", "Realschulabschluss", or 
"Fachhochschulreife") 
hauptschule  Dummy for individuals with other high school diploma ("Hauptschulabschluss" 
or "Volksschulabschluss"). Omitted category for school leaving degree. 
Highest professional qualification
qualifna  Dummy for no information, or not applicable 
mastercraft  Dummy for master craftsmen and technicians ("Meister", "Techniker") 
advtechncol  Dummy for individuals who graduated from an advanced technichal college 
("Fachhochschulabschuss") 
university  Dummy for individuals who graduated from a university 
apprenticeship  Dummy for individuals who finished an apprenticeship ("Anlernausbildung", 
"Lehrausbildung", or "Fachschule ehem. DDR"). Omitted category for 
professional qualification. 
Employment status of spouse  
spouseworkna  Dummy for no information, or not applicable 
spouseworking  Dummy for individuals whose spouse is working 
spsnotworking  Dummy for individuals whose spouse is not working. Omitted category for 
employment status of spouse. 
Employment status in previous year
emplstatepyna  Dummy for no information, or not applicable 
selfemplpy  Dummy for individuals who were self-employed in the previous year 
employedpy  Dummy for individuals who were employed in the previous year 
notemplpy  Dummy for individuals who were inactive in the previous year 
unemplpy   Dummy for individuals who were unemployed in the previous year. Omitted 
category for employment status in the previous year. 
City size  
medcity  Dummy for cities between 20,000 and 500,000 inhabitants (previous year) 
bigcity  Dummy for cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants (previous year) 
village  Dummy for cities with up to 20,000 inhabitants (previous year). Omitted 
category for city size. 
east  Dummy for individuals who live in one of the 5 new eastern federal states or 
Berlin 
nchild  Number of children under 18 in the household 
married  Dummy for married individuals 
spouseinc1000  Spouse's net income in € 1000 in April (0 if unmarried) 
otherinc1000  Other net household income in € 1000 in April 
(= net household income in April - net individual income in April, if positive) 
Dummy variables are equal to one if condition holds and zero otherwise. 
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